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Abstract  
This paper considers a model of an open economy in which the degree of income-tax 
progressivity influences the interaction among openness, central bank independence, and the 
inflation rate. Our model suggests that an increase in the progressivity of the tax system induces a 
smaller response in real output to a change in the price level. This implies that increased income-
tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation rate and that the effect of increased income-tax 
progressivity on inflation is smaller when the central bank places a higher weight on inflation or 
when there is greater openness. Examination of cross-country inflation data provides empirical 
support for these key predictions. 
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OPENNESS, INCOME-TAX PROGRESSIVITY, AND INFLATION 
 
1.  Introduction 
A significant literature has developed since Romer’s (1993) seminal paper 
exploring the nature of the relationship between the extent of openness to international 
trade and inflation.  Romer’s motivation for the negative dependence of inflation on 
openness observed in cross-country data hinged on the idea that greater openness 
might worsen the terms of the output-inflation trade-off, thereby reducing a monetary 
authority’s incentive to inflate. This rationale best applies to countries sizable enough to 
affect international relative prices, and Lane (1997) explored how greater openness can 
reduce the potential output gains from unexpected inflation in non-traded-goods sectors 
with imperfectly competitive goods markets and sticky prices.  Nevertheless, Temple’s 
(2002) examination of the relationship between openness and sacrifice ratios across a 
range of nations cast doubt on Romer’s proposed explanation of the openness-inflation 
relationship.  Daniels and VanHoose (2007) and Razin and Yuen (2002) offered 
alternative perspectives indicating that in fact the sacrifice ratio should respond 
positively to an increased degree of openness, yet inflation nevertheless should decline.  
Daniels et al. (2005) and Razin and Loungani (2005) have provided empirical support 
for a positive relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio, while preserving the 
predicted inverse relationship between openness and inflation found in the data by 
Romer and others. 
Missing from this literature to date has been consideration of the role that a 
nation’s tax structure likely has on the equilibrium inflation rate.  This paper considers 
an open-economy framework that implies that in a more progressive tax system, the 
marginal tax rate is more responsive to a given change in real income.  Consequently, 
an increase in real output induced by a rise in the price level raises the marginal tax rate 
by a larger amount, which reduces the actual rise in output generated by a given 
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increase in the price level.  This reduces the incentive to increase money growth in an 
effort to raise the price level in an effort to boost output.  Thus, money growth and 
inflation are lower, ceteris paribus, when the tax system is more progressive.   
Our model also indicates that the degree of central bank independence also 
plays a role in influencing how the progressivity of the income-tax system and openness 
affect inflation.  This is true because central bank independence has its own effects on 
the latter two variables, thereby conditioning the impacts of variations in income-tax 
progressivity and openness.   
To evaluate the predictions forthcoming from the theoretical model, we consider 
cross-country data on income-tax progressivity, openness, central bank independence, 
and inflation.  Empirical analysis of cross-country inflation rates provides empirical 
support favoring the theoretical prediction of a negative relationship between inflation 
and the progressivity of the income tax system.  This analysis also supports the theory’s 
subsidiary implications that greater openness and increased central bank independence 
both reduce the effects of income-tax progressivity on inflation. 
The next section presents our theoretical model and its predictions regarding 
how income-tax progressivity, openness, central bank independence affect the inflation 
rate.  Section 3 assesses the empirical implications of our analysis and evaluates the 
evidence.  Section 6 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
2.  A Model of the Interplay Among Openness, Progressive Taxation, and Inflation  
 The theoretical framework is based in part on the model developed in Daniels 
and VanHoose (2007).  There are numerous atomistic firms, indexed i, distributed 
uniformly along a unit interval.  A portion, , of firms have workforces that contractually 
set nominal wages in advance of labor-market clearing.  Spot labor markets determine 
nominal wages in the portion of firms, 1-, that do not have such contracts.  Duca and 
VanHoose (2001) have shown in a closed-economy version of this basic framework that 
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if risk-neutral firms and risk-averse workers face common aggregate shocks and 
heterogeneously distributed firm-specific disturbances,   typically lies between zero 
and unity but declines as the variability of firm-specific disturbances increases relative to 
the volatility of aggregate shocks.  To maintain tractability, we treat   as an exogenous 
parameter and thereby abstract from considerations of disturbances that influence the 
share of firms with nominal wage contracts.   
We also consider the competitive limit of the Daniels-VanHoose framework, in 
which we take into account income taxation.  The output produced by a given firm i is  
 
(1) yi = li , 
 
where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at firm i.  We abstract from 
productivity or other shocks that would not influence trend inflation in the standard 
Barro-Gordon (1983) discretionary-policy framework.  The domestic nation’s income-
expenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation of this Cobb-Douglas approximation, 
see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991, or Bryson, et. al., 1993) is given by 
 
(2) y = η(p* + s - p) + (1-β)y + βy*; 
 
where y 
1
0 diy i  is the log of aggregate domestic output; p 
1
0 dip i  is the log of the 
aggregate domestic price level; the average propensity to import, β, is a fraction;  is 
the elasticity of desired spending with respect to the real exchange rate; p* is the log of 
the aggregate foreign price level; s is the log of the domestic currency price of foreign 
currency; and y* is the log of aggregate foreign output.  Specifying analogous structural 
relationships for a foreign nation would yield a two-country framework in which y* and p* 
would be endogenous variables, but here we assume the output and prices abroad are 
exogenously determined.  Henceforth, the foreign money stock, foreign price level, and 
foreign output are normalized at unity, so that p* and y* equal zero.  Finally, domestic 
income is determined by the quantity equation,   
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(3) y = m – p, 
 
where m is the log of the money stock and where the log of velocity has been 
normalized at a value of zero.  
 Using (1) in the profit function, PiYi – WiLi , yields the labor demand function for a 
firm i (with the intercept suppressed because it plays no role in our subsequent 
analysis): 
 

 
- ( )
(4)      =  ,
1
d
i
i  w - p
l
 - 
 
 
where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm.   
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and foreign-produced 
goods.  Consequently, labor supply to firms depends on the after-tax real wage 
computed in terms of the overall price workers pay for a basket of both domestic and 
foreign goods: 
 
(5) li
s = [wi – (1-β)p – βs – ], 
 
where  > 0 and where  is the marginal tax rate applied to workers’ wage income, with 
all revenues collected by the government used to fund the distribution of lump-sum 
transfers to agents.   
For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information, market-
clearing wage satisfies (4) and (5) simultaneously and equals 
 
(
[ ]
       
 
^
 i
- p - s - p
w = 
[  (1  )+ 1] +  (1 ) )+ (1- )
(6)        .
 (1- ) + 1
 
 
Hence, this nominal wage rate, which is the wage actually paid by firm i if it is among 
the share, 1-, of firms without nominal wage contracts, depends positively on the 
  
 
5 
marginal income tax rate.  Substitution of (6) into either (4) or (5) and the result into (1) 
yields output of a noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:   
 
(
[ ]
   
 
mc
i
β s - p
y
 
 
) - (1- )  
(7)     =  .
(1- ) + 1
 
 
Thus, output of a firm without wage contracts responds negatively to a real depreciation 
of the home currency, because this reduces the purchasing power of workers’ wages 
and thereby generates a ceteris paribus decline in labor supply and hence a decline in 
spot-market employment at noncontract firms.  Because a higher marginal tax rate 
induces a decline in labor supply that requires paying a higher nominal wage, a 
noncontract firm’s output also depends negatively on the marginal tax rate. 
For atomistic wage setters within the fraction, , of firms with nominal wage 
contracts, the contract wage is equal to the expected value of the market clearing wage:  
 
(
[ ]
       
 
e e e e
c
 i
- p - s  - p
w = 
[  (1  )+ 1] +  (1 ) )+ (1- )
(8)        .
 (1- ) + 1
 
Substituting (8) into (4) and the result into (1) yields output of a firm with wage contracts:  
 
(
[ ]
        
  
e e e e
c
 i
- p - p - s  - p
y = 
- 
[  (1  )+ 1]( ) -  (1 ) ) - (1- )
(9)        .
(1  )  (1- ) + 1
 
 
Thus, output increases in response to price-level prediction errors, an anticipated real 
home currency appreciation, or an anticipated cut in the marginal tax rate. 
 To explore the implications of the structure of a nation’s tax system for the 
relationship between openness, the price-responsiveness of output, and inflation, we 
follow McCallum and Whitaker (1979), Benavie and Froyen (1986), and Waller and 
VanHoose (1989) by considering the marginal tax rate function given by 
 
(10)   =  0 1y + ,  
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where  0  is a base level of the marginal tax rate and 1 determines the degree of 
progressivity of the tax system.  If 1  = 0, the marginal tax rate is independent of 
income, implying a proportional tax system.  For 1  < 0, the tax system is regressive, 
and for 1  > 0, the tax system is progressive. 
 Firms behave identically, so that c ciy  = y  for all i  [0, ], 
nc nc
iy  = y  for all i   (, 
1].  It follows that y =  yc + (1-)ync.  Together with the marginal tax rate function in 
(10), equations (7) and (9) then imply a semi-reduced-form solution for ouput that can 
be combined with (3) and (2) to determine the semi-reduced forms for the log of the 
price level and the nominal exchange rate in terms of expected values of the various 
macroeconomic variables.  Substitution of these solutions back in the model then yields 
a semi-reduced-form expression for aggregate output: 
 
{
(
.
           
         

2
[ (1- )+1] [ (1- )+1] + (1- )[ + ( ) ( )]} 
(11) = 
[1- 1-  ) ][ (1- )+1]+(1- ) (1- )( + )
e e e e e
0 1
1
m - p s - p m - p
y  
This implies that the responsiveness of aggregate output to a change in the 
domestic price level is given by
       
       
  [ (1  ) + 1 ] + (1- ) (1  )  
=  ,
(1- )[ (1- )+1] + (1- ) (1- ) 1
y   -   -
 
 p
which is 
directly related to the magnitude of β.  Consequently, as in Daniels and VanHoose 
(2007), an increase in openness increases the sensitivity of output to a rise in the price 
level.  In addition, this price-sensitivity of output is inversely related to the 1  parameter 
and hence to the degree of progressivity of the income tax system.  In a more 
progressive tax system, the marginal tax rate is more responsive to a given change in 
real income.  An increase in real output induced by a given price-level increase thereby 
boosts the marginal tax rate by a larger amount under a more progressive income tax, 
which in turn tends to depress to a greater extent the actual output increase that is 
forthcoming from the given price-level increase.  Hence, an increase in the extent of 
income-tax progressivity brings about a smaller response in real output to a change in 
the price level, ceteris paribus, in a nation with a more progressive tax system. 
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Following Barro and Gordon (1983), we consider a Nash game involving the 
central bank and wage setters in which the central bank seeks to minimize the policy 
loss function, 
 
(12) L = E [(y - 
^
y )2 + bcbψ
2], 
 
where 
^
y  is the nondistorted, full-information economy-wide output under market 
clearing, bcb is the relative weight that the central bank places on the inflation 
component of its loss function, and ψ is the CPI inflation rate.  Re-solving the model 
under full information—that is, with se = s, pe = p, and me = m ex ante—yields 

     2
-
[ (1- ) +1+ + ]
0
1
 to be the full-information output level, which equals zero in a 
nondistorted situation in which  0  = 1  = 0.  Consequently, 
^
y = 0.  Under the simplifying 
assumption that p-1 = s-1 = 0, the CPI inflation rate is ψ = (1-β)p + βs.  Minimizing (16) 
with respect to m and solving for ψ ultimately yields 
 
               
           

   
 

       
 
  
 
 
 
 

2 2
2
1
( - ){( +1)(1- )+ [ (1- )+1]} - (1- ) [ (1- )+1]
(13)    = 
[ (1- )+1][1- (1- )]
(1- )
(1- )[ (1- )+1] + (1- )( + )
,0
cb
cb
b A
b A
 
 
where           2 21[ (1- )+ ][ (1- )+1] + (1- ) ( + ).A    
 An immediate implication of (13) is that 



 1
< 0 , so that an increase in the degree 
of progressivity of the tax system unambiguously reduces the equilibrium inflation rate 
under discretion.  An increase in tax progressivity makes output less sensitive to 
changes in the price level, which in turn reduces the incentive to increase money growth 
in an effort to raise the price level in an effort to boost output.  As a consequence, 
money growth and CPI inflation are lower, ceteris paribus, when the tax system is more 
progressive.   
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 Further evaluation of the expression for



 1
indicates that either an increase in bcb 
or in a rise in  causes the absolute value of this derivative to decrease.  An increase in 
the relative weight placed on inflation, bcb, in the central bank’s loss function reduces 
inflation, so the marginal effect on inflation of greater tax progressivity is lower at larger 
values of bcb.  As in Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Daniels et al. (2005), the direct 
effect of greater openness () is to increase the sensitivity of output with respect to the 
price level, so an increase in  tends to counter the effect of greater tax progressivity on 
inflation, thereby reducing the absolute value of 



 1
. 
In general, both the direct effect of greater openness and the effects of changes 
in the sensitivity of inflation with respect to openness resulting from variations in the 
degree of tax progressivity or the central bank’s loss weight on inflation depend on 
relative magnitudes of parameter values.  Evaluation of the direct effect of an increase 
in the degree of openness, , on inflation yields sufficient, but unnecessary, conditions 
for greater openness to reduce inflation 


 
 
 
that is, < 0 :  (1) most of the weight in the 
loss function is on the inflation objective (a sufficiently large value of bcb) or (2) the 
marginal propensity to import is sufficiently larger than the sensitivity of expenditures 
with respect to the real exchange rate ( 2 > ).  If 




< 0 , then it is also true that an 
increase in either1 or in bcb generate reductions in the absolute magnitude of this 
derivative; that is, in this case, either a greater degree of progressivity of the tax system 
or an increased policy weight on inflation tend to reduce the effect of increased 
openness on inflation.   
 The reason for the potential ambiguity in the inflation effects of openness is that 
greater openness exerts two conflicting effects.  On one hand, as in Daniels and 
VanHoose (2006) and Daniels et al. (2006), because labor supply depends on the real 
wage computed in terms of the overall price that workers pay for a basket of both 
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domestic and foreign goods, a real depreciation of the home currency reduces the 
purchasing power of market-clearing wages, which generates a ceteris paribus fall in 
labor supply that, in turn, causes a decline in spot-market employment.  Thus, the 
output of firms without wage contracts responds negatively to a real depreciation of the 
home currency, and this effect is enhanced in a more open economy, ultimately 
implying that a greater degree of openness causes output to be more responsive to 
inflation.  This, in turn, tends to increase the incentive for the central bank to push up 
money growth and generate higher equilibrium inflation. 
 On the other hand, increased openness reduces the extent to which an 
unanticipated real depreciation can potentially generate an increase in output.  To see 
this, note that (2) implies, under the maintained assumption p* = 0, that, ex ante, 
aggregate expenditures are given by y =  -1(s - p).  An increase in the value of the 
marginal propensity to import, , relative to the sensitivity of expenditures with respect 
to the real exchange rate, , thereby reduces the extent to which changes in the real 
exchange rate brought about my variations in the money stock can affect aggregate 
demand, ex ante.  This, in turn, reduces the incentive for a discretionary central bank to 
increase money growth.   
On net, therefore, the ex post effect of greater openness on equilibrium inflation 
is ambiguous in the present model, although as noted above, it is more likely to be 
negative if  2 > .  As noted above, from an ex ante perspective, a sufficiently higher 
initial value of the marginal propensity to import relative to an initial value of the 
expenditure responsiveness to the real exchange rate reduces the extent to which a 
monetary expansion can boost output via a discretionary increase in money growth.  At 
the same time, because CPI inflation is  = p + (s-p), a rise in the magnitude of  also 
has the effect of enlarging the extent to which the real exchange rate plays a role in 
determining equilibrium CPI inflation, which increases the ex ante incentive for the 
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central bank to reduce money growth.  This explains why if  is sufficiently large relative 
to , increased openness is more likely to reduce equilibrium inflation. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Implications and Evidence 
Following are the empirical implications of the forgoing discussion: 
  i)  increased income-tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation rate; 
 ii)  the effect of increased income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller when the 
central bank places a higher weight on inflation or when there is greater openness; 
and 
iii) the effect of greater openness on inflation is generally empirically ambiguous, but if 
this effect is negative, then it is absolutely smaller due to increased income-tax 
progressivity or when the central bank places a higher weight on inflation. 
 
To measure the degree of income-tax progressivity (Tax) for individual nations, 
we use the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate.  The marginal tax rate 
is measured by the change in single employees’ social security contribution and 
personal income tax payments in response to a change in gross wage earnings.  The 
average tax rate is the level of social security and tax payments divided by the level of 
gross wage earnings.  Both the marginal tax rate and the average tax rate are from 
Source OECD.1   
We use the measure of central bank independence described above along with 
the inflation rate, which is based on the GDP deflator, and openness, expressed as the 
ratio of imports to GDP, both derived from the IMF International Financial Statistics.  
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the sample data.   
Table 2 reports regression results for an annual sample of 17 countries covering 
the period 1979-1999.2  Because of the time-series nature of this data set, all 
regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors and correcting for 
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serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure.  Column (1) of the table provides 
results for the base specification that controls only for central bank independence and 
openness.  The coefficients for both variables are negative and statistically significant 
(although the p-value for openness is 8.4 percent). 
Column (2) of Table 2 reports a re-specification in which the tax progressivity 
measure is added.  The estimated coefficient for the Openness variable is not 
statistically significant in this specification.  The tax progressivity (Tax) coefficient, 
however, is negative and statistically significant, consistent with the theoretical model’s 
key implication that increased income-tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation 
rate.   
The regression specification in column (3) of Table 2 adds interactions of tax 
progressivity and central bank independence (Tax*CBI) and for tax progressivity and 
openness (Tax*Openness).  The estimated negative Openness coefficient is once again 
statistically significant (with a p-value of 6.5 percent) in this broadened specification.  
The interaction term between tax progressivity and central bank independence is also 
statistically significant and positive, consistent with the theoretical model’s prediction 
that the (negative) effect of greater income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller with 
greater central bank independence (assumed consistent with a higher central bank loss 
weight on inflation).  Consistent with the theoretical framework’s implication that the 
(negative) effect of greater income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller with greater 
openness, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between tax progressivity 
and openness is positive (indicating a absolute smaller effect of tax progressivity), but 
this coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
Column (4) in Table 2 considers the impact that outliers might have on the 
results.  To test for outliers, we use the dfits test, Cooksd test, and the Welsch distance 
test on the regression model in column (3).  The results for all three tests imply outliers 
in 1980 and 1982 for New Zealand, and in 1980 for the United States.  These three 
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observations are deleted from the specification in column (3) to generate the results in 
column (4).  Controlling for these outliers has no practical impact on our results. 
According to hypothesis (iii) implied by theoretical framework, if openness is 
statistically significant and negative, then its effect becomes absolutely smaller as the 
degree of tax progressivity increases.  Consistent with this hypothesis, the estimated 
coefficient on Tax*Openness is consistently positive, but it is never significant at a level 
of 10 percent or less.  To further explore the third hypothesis, we also added an 
interaction term between central bank independence and openness in specification (4).  
The only resulting changes are a positive but statistically insignificant effect of openness 
on inflation and an improvement in the p-value of the Tax*CBI interaction variable, to 
2.8 percent.  In addition, the estimated effect of the openness-CBI interaction term is 
negative and significant at the 10 percent level.  Hence, there is some support for the 
theoretical prediction that the impact of openness on inflation is empirically ambiguous 
once the degrees of income-tax progressivity and central bank independence are taken 
into account. 
We also consider some recent results regarding the relationship between 
openness and inflation.  According to Levin and Piger (2002) and Ihrig and Marquez 
(2003), time-series inflation data exhibit a break around the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Bleaney (1999) further notes that around the time of this same break, the economic and 
statistical significance of the openness-inflation relationship began to diminish among 
developing nations.  Including a dummy variable with a value of zero up until 1989 and 
a value of unity for the remainder of the sample period had little impact on our results.  
The p-value for Tax*CBI increased slightly, and the p-value for Tax*Openness 
decreased somewhat, moving both into the 10 to 15 percent significance range.3 
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6.  Conclusion 
This paper has developed an open-economy framework indicating that the 
structure of the tax system should worsen the terms of the output-inflation trade-off and 
reduce the equilibrium inflation rate.  Analysis of the inflation rates of seventeen nations 
provides support for our predictions regarding direct and interactive effects of income-
tax progressivity, openness, and central bank independence on inflation. 
The role of taxation as a factor influencing the interactions among openness, 
central bank independence, and inflation rates has not received attention in the 
literature.  The theoretical and empirical conclusions of this paper indicate that more 
consideration should be given to the role of fiscal variables as factors conditioning 
equilibrium inflation rates in open economies. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Data Used to 
Test Predictions Regarding Inflation 
 
Annual Panel of 17 Countries, 1970-1999a 
 Inflation Tax 
Progressivity 
Central Bank 
Independence 
Openness 
Mean  4.63 1.17 51.46 29.79 
Median 3.38 1.44 47.38 28.80 
St. Dev. 3.86 0,85 19.21 13.44 
a Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States 
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Table 2 
Inflation Estimates 
 
Annual Panel of 17 Countries, 1970-1999 
(Absolute Values of t-Ratios Based on Newey-West Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)a 
Constant 
9.097*** 
1.062 
9.506*** 
1.019 
16.345*** 
2.935 
15.071*** 
2.769 
CBI 
-0.062*** 
0.0132 
-0.062*** 
0.013 
-0.168*** 
0.057 
-0.149*** 
0.053 
Openness 
-2.904* 
1.675 
-1.665 
1.806 
-5.978* 
3.232 
-5.418** 
3.046 
Tax 
 -0.702*** 
0.226 
-4.757*** 
1.636 
-4.157*** 
1.553 
Tax*CBI 
  0.064** 
0.031 
0.054* 
0.029 
Tax*Openness 
  1.742 
1.616 
1.640 
1.523 
F Statistic 14.50 15.07 10.55 28.42 
Observations 357 357 357 354 
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
a
 The model in column 4 omits three outliers; 1980 and 1982 for New Zealand and 1980 for the United 
States. 
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
1
 During the 1979-1993 interval, the OECE reports tax rates only for odd years.  For this 
period, missing observations on the tax rates were imputed using the average of the 
two adjacent rates.  All of the data used in this paper and all regression results are 
available upon request. 
2
 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States.   
3
 Overall, the effect of openness on inflation shows the greatest sensitivity to model 
specification and controls for model breaks and outliers. 
